MTB 495

[Admin]

The Coastal Forces Log: PRO: ADM/199/2418 is an official document held by the Public Record Office at Kew, in London. The precise nature of the document, who compiled it and why, is not known. It consists of daily entries that are written in pencil, not typed, and gives lists of the patrols mounted each day, along with the boats assigned to them, and a brief digest of notable events, such as contact with E-boats, when they occurred.

These summaries were presumably drawn from action reports written by Commanding Officers of boats, that would have been sent to Nore Command from the various Coastal Forces bases of the boats concerned. So the document represents an overview of all the resources deployed for a day – something only Nore Command would know – coupled with highlights of action reports. The reference numbers for the action reports, and the bases from which they originated – Mantis at Lowestoft and Beehive at Felixstowe – are noted in the document, but I didn’t manage to find any record of these reports when performing a search on the PRO web site.

The action report written by the Commanding Officer of MTB 495, would provide the definitive account of who and what struck 495, if that report still exists anywhere. Not all of the action reports were kept after the war unfortunately, and it’s not known where exactly Len Reynolds obtained the information about the boat having been hit in the engine room, by what I can only assume was gunfire from an E-Boat.

The meanings for the various patrol prefixes are not known, beyond the obvious ones such as Tongue Sand (FB6), nor are the exact sea areas that the patrol numbers referred to, but it seems the boat units all had assigned areas in which to take up station, which they did not leave, even to pursue E-boats. Instead, they were controlled throughout by the Coastal Forces Control Frigates, who vectored the MTB on to targets, using their superior radar. This way you would not have had MTBs roving around unidentified in the sea lanes, thereby helping to prevent the possibility of friendly fire from the destroyer units. If the locations for the S-Boot flotillas for times during the night, could be matched with the areas for the patrol numbers given in this document, you might be able to work out which boats fought which exactly.

As may be seen from the document below, considerable resources were deployed by the Royal Navy each night in defence of the East Coast convoy route, with some 40 MTBs and 8 motor launches at sea on this particular night, along with the other resources. By this late stage of the war the Royal Navy enjoyed overwhelming superiority in the number of boats they had for use in the North Sea and Channel, and each E-boat sunk or captured weakened the Kriegsmarine still further.

Finally, MTB 495 did return to patrols, forming a Patrol 22 with MTBs 497, 470, 456 on 27th March, 1945, and may well have returned to service earlier than that. The boat survived the war and was placed on the disposal list in September 1945.

The Coastal Forces Log for 22nd January, 1945, held at the Public Record Office (PRO)

Coastal Forces Log for 22nd January 1945. © Public Record Office (ADM/199/2418)

Transcript of Coastal Forces Log for 22nd January, 1945

22nd January, Monday

Ostend A/S Patrols
FG 5 MLs 252, 286, 442, 467 sailed 05.25
FC 4

Z15 MTBs 679, 609
Z13 MTBs 773, 766
Z11 MTBs 721, 5002
Z9 MTBs 387, 390
Z7 MTBs 223, 233
Z5 MTBs 383, 392
Z3 MTBs 381, 382
53 buoy MTBs 445, 444
Patrol 12 MTBs 482, 478, 454, 447
Patrol 18 MTBs 495, 446, 496, 497
Tounge Sand (FB6) MTBs 451, 452, 450
FH3 4(HK4) MTBs 491, 485, 348, 355
Stein BK MLs 252, 286, 442, 467
FB2 MTBs 795, 768
FA8 MTBs 755, 775, 695
Patrol 16 MTBs 776, 756, 769, 771

Tongue Sand Fort FB6, Patrol 12, 16, 18 engaged E Boats}
C in C Nore 23/621A
Mantis 23/034A
Beehive 23/502A

MTBs 451, 452, 450, 495, 446, 454, 447 engaged
MTB 495 sustained damage 1 killed, 3 injured, returning, also MTB 446 returned, not in company.

The Work of the Coastal Forces Control Frigates
The Control Frigates had highly experienced former MTB Commanding Officers onboard them, helping to co-ordinate the actions between the destroyers and the MTB units, and this account for Lieutenant R G O Hudson DSC RNVR provides an insight into the organisation of these defensive patrols.

...Once passed as fully fit for sea service, he was appointed to HMS Hornet in May 1944, for special service with Captain Coastal Forces (CCF) Channel. It was here that he was involved in the development of radar control tactics for MTBs that would lead to the award of his DSC.

MTB actions were often highly confused, as the situational awareness of such small platforms was low, and in the run up to Operation Overlord there was concern at the risk of friendly fire accidents with so many allied vessels operating in the channel. As a result, officers from the MTB force were embarked in radar-equipped frigates which were directed to operate with groups of MTBs. The control officer would use early radar displays, known as Plan Position Indicators (PPIs) to vector MTBs onto prospective targets, deconflicting them with other allied operations.

The technique was implemented for the D-Day landings and continued during the subsequent allied advance along the French coast. During this period Hudson and his colleagues Lt P G Lee DSC* RNVR and Lt R G Fison DSC RNVR were embarked in a variety of frigates, including HM Ships Thornborough, Retalick and Seymour. In the Action Report, CINC Portsmouth, Admiral C Little, remarked “In general the reports indicate that the destroyer Commanding Officers found the control exercised from the frigates to be invaluable.”

The citation for the award of the Distinguished Service Medal to Able Seaman Billington, although for actions that took place on later dates, provides further insight into these operations.

‘For bravery, daring and skill whilst serving in H.M. ships Riou and Seymour and H.M.C. Motor Torpedo Boat 743 in successful engagements with enemy E-Boats.’

The original recommendation states:

‘During the night of 20-21 February 1945, H.M.S. Riou and Coastal Forces units controlled by her, engaged four separate groups of four E-Boats within the space of two hours, driving them all away from the swept channels. On the night of 24-25 February, three groups of E-Boats were similarly engaged, one E-Boat being stopped and subsequently sunk during the engagements, 22 prisoners being taken. On the night of 28 February-1 March, two groups of E-Boats were engaged and driven off by Riou and Coastal Forces controlled by her, the E-Boats suffering damage.

This rating is a Radar Operator using American-type S.L. Radar in H.M.S. Riou. During the above engagements Billington was outstanding in his accuracy and coolness in interpreting an extremely complex scan and reporting to the plot. At times he had to recognise and report as many as five targets at one time, all these targets moving at high speed, merging and separating as interceptions were made and actions broken off. He did not make one single mistake in his reports. This feat required calm and detachment on the part of Billington, combined with a quick and accurate memory, at a time when the ship was proceeding at full power with frequent alterations of course with the additional distractions of frequent gunfire from our own main armament and continuous R./T. chatter close to his position.’

[CAM]

Thank you very much.
Perhaps report commander MTB-495 is here

http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.u ... i=C6422899

but I can not see it, as well as report on the MTB-220.

[Admin]

Yes that looks like a record pertaining to the repair work that needed doing on the boat, but may not contain details of how the damage came about. Some of the Public Record Office records have been digitised and are available to view online, but most have not, so you would have to request a scan of this record if you wished to see it, for which there would be a charge. The only other way is to visit the archives in person, which is free.