The histories of war have many times been described as resembling parts of grand tapestries. When it is realised that all written history can only reflect the writer’s interpretation of events, as revealed within his or her own research; even when the record is of an actual personal experience, the writer selects—either consciously or subconsciously—the detail that he or she wishes to emphasise. This is commonly known as bias and is very difficult, if not impossible, for writers to avoid.
The opportunity to read an official war report however, may give a reader a chance to witness dramatic events as seen through the eyes of a participant. Devoid of any contamination that the passing of time may give to other written histories, this is as close as the written word allows a reader to approach a small scrap of the grand tapestry that makes up the history of the Second World War.
This naval war report is just one of the many thousands that were written shortly after forays into war zones. These reports were required so as the Chiefs of Naval Staff, and possibly their political leaders, could get an accurate picture of a particular operation, or when used collectively, learn how the war was progressing or being conducted—hopefully to assist in the strategic and tactical planning for any future forays.
As a very experienced Senior Officer of a ‘D’ boat flotilla—the 55th—this writer would have been operating under a broad order from his superiors. He would also have been aware that his report in requiring to be both accurate and in some detail, might also be scrutinised for any failings in the execution of that broad order.
Although written three days after the action, a little imagination may be required as to the state of mind of the original writer. The report gives no indication of any personal trauma suffered from the violent events that happened on that particular night. He was not listed within the list of casualties, so we may deduce that he had no physical injuries. However, the experience of being once more under direct and accurate gunfire, but this time witnessing the inferno and total loss of a vessel under his overall charge as the Senior Officer of the flotilla—together with almost its entire crew—would most certainly have added to the enormous strains that the war was placing upon the shoulders of such men and their crews.
No records of wireless transmissions and charts, mentioned in the report, and used on the night are available to us here; nevertheless, here is an opportunity to read an official record of an operation; one of many hundreds of such operations that Coastal Forces conducted during the Second World War.
The date set is just four days before the tragedies that befell Exercise Tiger and six weeks before Operation Neptune, the code name given to the naval contribution to Operation Overlord, more commonly known as the D-Day landings.
ON NIGHT OF 23RD/24TH APRIL, 1944
FROM… THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. HORNET.
DATE… 29TH APRIL, 1944. NO. 0836/0.1
TO… THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PORTSMOUTH (3)
Copies to:- Admiralty. Deputy Director of Operations
Division (Coastal)
Commander-in-Chief, Nore (5)
Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth (3)
Commander-in-Chief, Rosyth.
Flag Officer-in-Charge, Dover (2)
Flag Officer-in-Charge, Portland.
Naval Officer-in-Charge, Newhaven.
Captain Coastal Forces (Channel) (2)
Captain (D), Portsmouth.
Commanding Officer, H.M.S. BEE.
Commanding Officer, H.M.S. ATTACK.
Commanding Officer, H.M.S. AGGRESSIVE.
Senior Officer, 55th M.T.B. Flotilla.
Report of the Senior Officer 55th M.T.B. Flotilla is submitted in accordance with Confidential Admiralty Fleet Ordor [sic] 1734/43.
2. The unit consisted of:-
M.T.B. 617 Lieutenant Commander D.G. Bradford, D.S.C.*, R.N.R., S.O.
M.T.B. 632 Lieutenant C.W. Ford, R.N.V.R.
M.T.B. 671 Lieutenant L.E. Toogood, R.N.V.R.
3. The possibility of a successful Torpedo attack on the three destroyers had been carefully weighed up by the Senior Officer, but owing to the Commanding Officer, M.T.B. 671, not conforming to his Senior Officer’s movements the position of the M.T.B. was compromised through M.T.B. 671 starting up main engines before M.T.B. 617 had done so. As a result the Destroyers turned straight for the unit just before the latters sights came on.
4. In the running fight that ensued, the M.T.B.s gave a good account of themselves, and undoubtedly inflicted damage on the enemy. Great credit is due to Lieutenant Commander G.D. Bradford, D.S.C.*, R.N.R, Senior Officer of the flotilla for the skilful manner in which he extricated M.T.B.s 617 and 632 from a very awkward situation and against great odds.
5. M.T.B. 671 was hit aft by a large calibre shell and stopped at 0357, and was then heavily engaged by one of the enemy destroyers. Casualties were considerable and owing to fires in the petrol compartments and in other parts of the craft getting out of hand she became a total loss.
6. From the accounts of the two survivors, Sub. Lieutenant Morley and Able Seaman Day, it is evident that everything was done to save the craft. Unfortunately it is not possible to definitely ascertain how many ratings abandoned ship as the Captain gave the order on two occasions, some who went overboard the first time swam back to the craft. Ten or eleven finally abandoned ship but only two survived.
7. List of recommendations for Honours and Awards will be submitted separately.
Enclosure No. 1 to H.M.S. HORNET’s No.0836/0.1 dated 29th April, 1944.
SECRET. M.T.B. 617.
25th April, 1944.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report for night of 23rd/24th April, 1944:-
(1) Nature of Action.
Gun action against three destroyers
(2) Own Force.
Unit 617, 632 and 671.
(3) Duty on which Unit was employed.
Anti-shipping patrol in position 040° Pointe de Bar Fleur 9 miles.
(4) Weather Conditions.
Wind north west – force 0 to 1. sea – flat calm. Swell – nil. Visibility 3,000 yards, closing to thick fog.
(5) General Narrative.
Unit ‘L’ M.T.B.s 617, 632, 671 slipped in accordance with Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth’s 231418B and proceeded via F buoy to position 040° PDB 9 miles arriving at 2305, when unit stopped and set hydrophone watch. Visibility was good, sea flat calm. Whilst unit was approaching the patrol position it was orbited by aircraft, and many spurious echos [sic] and photoflashes were observed. Most of the photoflash being to the South East; several white flares were also observed in the direction of Cherbourg. these flares continued during the whole of the night at varying periods.
At 0107 Starshell was seen to the Westward, and a unit was heard on R/T being engaged by the enemy. At this time two lights giving the appearance of most headlights with the lower cne towards the unit were exhibited on land in the direction of Cherbourg. The lights were switched on regularly every three minutes, burning for 25 seconds. The bearing of the lights patrol position was South 75° West magnetic at 0127, MTB 617 having developed defect in her Hydrophone set Radar watch, and an attempt was made to jam the Radar. This attempt continued throughout the remainder of the night with various degrees of success, and at 0143 QH was also jammed for approximately 15 minutes.
At 0153 gunfire and lights were observed to the North West and this continued until 0200 when a flare was fired, apparently on shore, bearing South 60° West from the patrol position. The flare being one red and three green stars.
At 0343 the noise of engines was heard by ear to the South West and immediately afterwards Radar contact was made with three echos, bearing 250°, range 4,000 yards. The plot indicated that contact would pass ahead of the unit at approximately 2,000 yards range, and the unit prepared to fire torpedoes.
At 0346 three destroyers in close order were observed through glasses, range approximately 2,500 yards, speed of advance from the plot being 20 knots. It was hoped the unit would be unobserved as the destroyers did not appear to be altering towards. The Senior Officer decided to remain with engines cut as the destroyers would have
Page 2 of Enclosure No. 1. to H.M.S. HORNET’s 0836/0.1 dated 29.4.44.
unquestionably been warned if the main engines had been started. However it was impossible to pass this by R/T or Loud Hailer without probability of the noise being heard by the enemy.
At 0346½, just before the destroyers crossed torpedo sights, M.T.B. 671 started main engines, and a few seconds afterwards the destroyers were observed to alter course by a blue turn towards the unit, range being approximately 1,800 to 2,000 yards. The Senior Officer crash started, and M.T.B. 632 followed his movement. Starshell was fired by the destroyers as the unit got underway and altered course sharply to starboard to get on to a Northerly course to disengage. M.T.B. 632 was ordered to illuminate the destroyers with Pom Pom Starshell in order to confuse their point of aim, and the unit was ordered to make smoke. As the unit turned onto a Northerly course all boats opened fire on the destroyers with Oerliken, and M.T.B. 671 opened fire with Pom Pom on the leading destroyer which had taken up position on the starboard beam of the unit. Unit formed into Order 1 and M.T.Bs 632 and 671 endeavoured to take cover in the smoke layed from M.T.B. 617. The destroyers had opened fire with main and secondary armament, and had taken up position on either quarter of the unit and one astern at approximately 800-1000 yards range by Radar. There were many spurious echoes on the scan at this time, and it is thought that this was caused by “window” dropped from aircraft. M.T.Bs 632 and 671 obtained hits from Pom Pom on the ‘A’ turret and bridge of the starboard destroyer on the port quarter, and a fire seemed to break out immediately abaft its funnel and gave the appearance of a ready use magazine on fire as there appeared to be small explosions in the centre of the fire. This destroyer stopped firing and remained silent for approximately five minutes, although it maintained its position on the port quarter of the unit. The fire on the destroyer blazed for about five minutes, and when it had been put out the destroyer re-engaged the unit.
At 0357 the Senior Officer observed that M.T.B. 671 had been hit aft by a large calibre shell as there was a big flash and a gush of flame apparently around the engine room. She immediately reported by R/T that she was hit and stopped, and the remainder of the unit which had stopped making smoke was ordered to make smoke again (632 immediately dropped one smoke float), and an attempt was made to alter course to port to provide a smoke cover for M.T.B. 671. This was frustrated by the destroyers, who altered course and prevented M.T.B 617 firing torpedoes at the destroyer on the port quarter, and manoeuvred to remain in position on either quarter of the unit. The destroyer which had been astern of the unit was observed to hotly engage M.T.B. 671 at close range, and many hits were observed from all calibre shells. The remainder of the unit was compelled to disengage as the fire from the remaining destroyers was becoming very accurate, and M.T.B. 617 had an explosion on the after deck when an Oerlikon magazine partly blew up. M.T.B. 632 had also received many hits from Oerlikon.
At 0400 M.T.B. 632 was ordered to drop a depth charge to attempt to shake off one of the pursuing destroyers which was astern of the unit. This succeeded as the rear destroyer did not bother the unit again. A zig zag course was maintained, and the enemy was engaged with Oerlikon whenever visible through the smoke, and at 0408 the unit was ordered to blue 20° to starboard to put the destroyer on the port quarter dead astern, and M.T.B. 632 was again ordered to drop a depth charge. This exploded most satisfactorily about 200 yards ahead of the destroyer, and the destroyer was observed to alter course sharply to port and steam away on an opposite course.
Page 3 of Enclosure No. 1. to H.M.S. HORNET’s 0836/0.1 dated 29.4.44.
At 0438, when only one destroyer remained in company, unit was ordered to assume 7 Order, and immediately afterwards blued 30° to port putting the remaining destroyer dead astern. The suspended depth charge was then dropped and this again exploded approximately 200 yards ahead of the remaining destroyer.
At 0441 unit stopped as it had run into a patch of coastal fog. Casualties and damage were then assessed, and M.T.B. 632 was reported to be making water in the forward messdeck causing extreme unhandiness at speed. It was considered that any survivors from M.T.B. 671 would probably have been picked up by the first German destroyer to return, and the Senior Officer decided to return to harbour, arriving in harbour at 08.30.
Sub. Lieutenant C.W. Morley, R.N.V.R. the only surviving officer of M.T.B. 671 who was picked up by H.M.S. ROWLEY later in the day, reports that all C.Bs and secret documents carried were consumed by fire, and that the ship subsequently sank after being gutted by fire.
(6) Casualties in Unit.
M.T.B. 617.
S.V. EVERSON, Able Seaman, P/JX. 295927- Slightly wounded in head.
M.T.B. 632.
Stanley ROEBUCK, Able Seaman, C/JX. 352495 – Fatal.
J.J.L. BROWN, Able Seaman, P/JX. 347505 — Slightly wounded in hand.
D.A. TARRANT, Ordinary Tel. D/JX. 453046 — Slightly wounded in leg.
M.T.B. 671
Killed
Lieutenant L.E. TOOGOOD, RNVR
Sub Lieutenant P.L. SMALLWOOD, RNVR (M.T.B. 650 embarked in M.T.B. 671.)
Lieutenant J.L. HORLEY, R.N.V.R.
W.G. SAUNDERS, Telegraphist, C/JX. 341007.
J. LAMBERT, Able Seaman, C/JX. 376632.
C. ROOK, Able Seaman, C/JX. 301352.
B. DEAN, Petty Officer, D/JX. 140045.
J.A. BUCKLEY, Acting Chief Motor Mechanic, P/MX. 116188.
R.G. BROWN, Able Seaman, P/JX. 369893.
W.W. MACPHERSON, Able Seaman, P/JX. 417851.
F. WHARTON, Telegraphist, P/JX. 405825.
Wounded
A.R. DAY, Able Seaman, C/JX. 376546 – Shrapnel in arm.
Missing
Midshipman E.C. WOODHEAD, R.N.V.R.
R.W. JONES, Able Seaman, P/JX. 421023.
L.R. SIMMS, Stoker II, C/KX. 158876.
K.D. GROVES, Stoker I, D/KX. 158677.
M. HARDIE, Stoker I, C/KX. 158851.
G.D. HILL, Wireman, P/MX. 102404.
E. LEONARD, Able Seaman, P/JX. 396438.
F. PULLEN, Able Seaman, P/JX. 296446.
C. BROOKE, Leading Motor Mechanic, P/MX. 635894.
J. OWEN, Ordinary Seaman, P/JX. 396223.
D.S. GOLDSWORTHY, Leading Seaman, D/SSX. 26540.
R. RUSSELL, Able Seaman, P/JX. 385946.
Page 4/Over……..
SECRET.
Page 4 of Enclosure No. 1. to H.M.S. HORNET’s 0836/0.1 dated 29.4.44.
Missing
G.H. WOODBURN, Able Seaman, P/JX. 385979.
L. LEGG, Ordinary Seaman, P/JX. 428612.
(7) Damage to the Unit.
M.T.B. 617 – Hit in aft Oerlikon magazine by Oerlikon causing fire and explosion. Several hits on emergency steering column and deck aft from Oerlikon shells.
M.T.B. 632 – Gun communications shot away on bridge. Hit in the chart house by Oerlikon. Hit on water line forward by 40 m.m. and several hits on superstructure and Oerlikon magazine by 20 m.m. shells.
M.T.B. 671 – Total loss.
(8) Items of Interest.
Throughout the whole of the night there were many spurious echos and much photoflash was observed, and flares were dropped mostly to the Westward. Window appeared to be dropped several times during the night from aircraft, and aircraft were continually in the vicinity if the unit. All navigation lights on the coast visible at long range appeared to be lit, and continuous attempts were made to jam the Radar. The German destroyers were apparently well drilled in the tactics necessary for engaging a small unit of M.T.Bs and their tactics could not have presented a more difficult problem to a small unit, as they did not take advantage of their far superior speed to gain bearing on the unit thus allowing the unit to attempt to fire torpedoes after a quick swing to bring the tubes to bear.
(9) General conclusions.
It is considered that had a larger unit of M.T.Bs been engaged, say six in number, it would have been possible to scatter in pairs, using /FY CG, and had the destroyers split up to follow the individual units, each unit could have split up into separate boats and probably one boat in each unit would have had the opportunity of making a torpedo attack whilst the destroyer concentrated on the other boat of the unit. It seems apparent that “window” was dropped over the unit which had been ascertained by shore Radar or D.F. bearings of the Radar transmissions from M.T.B. 617, and it is also considered that the destroyers were not using Radar as they would probably have then approached head on to the unit, presenting the minimum visible target and running no risk of being hit by torpedoes.
(10) Recommendations.
Nil.
(11) List of Signals Sent and Received.
Attached.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) D. Gould Bradford.
Lieutenant Commander, R.N.R.
Senior Officer 55th M.T.B. Flotilla.
The Commanding Officer,
H.M.S. HORNET.
DGB/RMS. Enclosure:- Appendices.
Enclosure No. 3. to H.M.S. HORNET’s 0836/0.1 dated 29.4.44.
SECRET.
Appendices
(1) Track Chart – attached
(2) Communications.
R/T was completely satisfactory except for a short period during the engagement when a sticky relay in the set onboard M.T.B. 617 temporarily prevented communication
W/T – TW 12 set proved completely reliable. Signals from Portsmouth being very loud and clear although signals transmitted from Portland were heard with difficulty.
(3) Gunnery.
M.T.B. 617
(i) 6 Pdr. Mk. VII HE – Rounds fired – Nil.
Oerlikon – 1 Prac. 1 HEI, 1 HEIT – Rounds fired – 360.
(ii) No stoppages or misfires.
(iii) Hits on superstructure of destroyers were observed and a fire seen to break out on one destroyer.
(iv) Action fought at range of 1000 – 800 yards
(v) Action lasted intermittently for 40 minutes
(vi) The 6 pdr. would not bear on the destroyers due to them keeping station on the quarters of the unit.
M.T.B. 632.
2 Pounder Pom Pom was used to illuminate and engage target, and several bursts were seen to hit the bridge and ‘A’ turret of one destroyer.
Oerlikon was used to engage during most of the action as difficulty was experienced in bringing the Pom Pom to bear. The firing was accurate and hits were observed on both destroyers stationed on the quarters.
The Vickers .5 were used when the destroyers were within 800 yards, but whilst the direction of fire appeared accurate no results could be observed.
Guns were loaded as follows:-
| Rounds fired | |
| 2 Pdr. Pom Pom – Starshell 100% | 55 |
| Oerlikon — 2 HE, 1 HEIT – | 360 |
| 5 Machine Guns – 3 SAP, 1 Tracer | 1,030 |
No misfires or stoppages occurred on board any boat.
(4) Torpedoes. – Nil.
(5) Smoke.
Due to lack of wind smoke lay dead astern on each occasion that it was laid. Width was given to the lay of smoke by jinking the boat about twenty degrees each side of the course. M.T.B. 632 used
Page 2 to Enclosure No.3 to H.M.S. HORNET’s No.0836/0.1 dated 29.4.41.
SECRET.
(5) Smoke (cont’d)
the smoke laid by M.T.B. 617 to give herself cover and zig-zagged from one side of it to the other on each occasion. The smoke float was dropped in the hope that the slight wind blowing might carry the smoke down and afford M.T.B. 671 cover from one side.
(6) Radar.
Numerous spurious echos were picked up during the whole of the night, apparently caused by “window” and later, patches of mist or fog, but all sets were otherwise completely reliable.
(7) Hydrophone.
M.T.B. 617. – A faulty lead developed in the Hydrophone.
M.T.B. 632. – The Hydrophone worked perfectly. Hydrophone conditions were apparently perfect although no warning was obtained by M.T.B. 632’s Hydrophone of the approach of the destroyers. The Hydrophone has since been tested and found to be still in excellent condition and it is considered that possibly the Hydrophone conditions were bad due to layers of water at different density.
(8) Any other Technical Matters. — Nil.
A List of recommendations for Honours and Awards will be submitted under separate cover.
(signed) D. Gould Bradford
Lieutenant Commander, R.N.R.
Senior Officer 55th M.T.B. Flotilla